We propose the scheme that mitigates the adversarial perturbation on the adversarial example X adv (= X ± , X is a benign sample) by subtracting the estimated perturbationˆ from X + and addingˆ to X − . The estimated perturbation comes from the difference between X adv and its moving-averaged outcome W avg * X adv where
W avg is N ×N moving average kernel that all the coefficients are one. Usually, the adjacent samples of an image are close to each other such that we can let X ≈ W avg * X (naming this relation after X-MAS[X minus Moving Averaged Samples]). By doing that, we can make the estimated perturbationˆ falls within the range of . The scheme is also extended to do the multi-level mitigation by configuring the mitigated adversarial example X adv ±ˆ as a new adversarial example to be mitigated. The multi-level mitigation gets X adv closer to X with a smaller (i.e. mitigated) perturbation than original unmitigated perturbation by setting the moving averaged adversarial sample W avg * X adv (which has the smaller perturbation than X adv if X ≈ W avg * X) as the boundary condition that the multi-level mitigation cannot cross over (i.e. decreasing cannot go below and increasing cannot go beyond). With the multi-level mitigation, we can get high prediction accuracies even in the adversarial example having a large perturbation (i.e. > 16). The proposed scheme is evaluated with adversarial examples crafted by the FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) based attacks on ResNet-50 trained with ImageNet dataset.
Introduction
Adversarial perturbations (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Carlini & Wagner, 2016; Guo et al., 2018) for a CNN (Convolutional Neural Network) are crafted to make a CNN classifier mispredict its input image. Usually, the perturbations are imperceptible to human eyes especially for the case where the sizes of the perturbation (as known as ) are small (i.e. ≤ 16 in the FGSM [Fast Gradient Sign Method] based attack (Kurakin et al., 2016a) ). However, even in the case that an adversarial perturbation on an input image is large (> 16), human beings can classify the image with a correct label.
For the defense of a CNN against the adversarially perturbed images, there have been the approaches (Buckman et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016b) to make neural networks robust against the perturbations. Fundamentally, the approaches need to have a full data set of neural networks for a re-training. Also, there are some other approaches which do not require any modification of neural networks (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Dziugaite et al., 2016; Prakash et al., 2018) . The approaches utilize the property that adversarial perturbations tend to exist on a high-frequency region (Guo et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2019) . Thus, the low-pass image filter (i.e. DCT [Discrete Cosine Transform] or wavelet denoising) deletes the perturbations on a high-frequency region by cutting off highfrequency components. However, they are not so effective for the adversarial example having a large perturbation (Dziugaite et al., 2016) .
The image transformations such as DCT and wavelet were developed to make the image with less information (i.e. compressed one with less bits) seemingly have a good quality comparable to original one for human beings. They utilize that human beings are not sensitive to small changes of an image. If the techniques originally developed for the less-sensitive human beings (not for the defense against the adversarial perturbations) can be used to invalidate a relatively small perturbation (i.e. ≤ 16), it would be able to nullify a large perturbation if we can make the large perturbation become a smaller one that the image transformation can delete.
For the mitigation of an adversarial perturbation of the adversarial example X adv (= X ± ), we find the estimated perturbationˆ and add it to X adv in the direction of making | | small (i.e. X adv −ˆ for + , X adv +ˆ for − ). The estimated perturbation comes from the difference between X adv and its moving-averaged outcome W avg * X adv where W avg is N × N moving average kernel that all the coefficients are one. Since X ≈ W avg * X among the adjacent samples of an image, we can make the difference between X adv and W avg * X adv less than . For a large adversarial perturbation (e.g. > 16), the mitigation scheme is extended to do the multi-level mitigation by configuring the mitigated adversarial example as a new adversarial example to be mitigated further. Also, in order to guarantee that more mitigation steps get the adversarial perturbation smaller, the less perturbed moving averaged sample (i.e. W avg * X adv is closer to X than X adv if X ≈ W avg * X) is set as the boundary condition that the mitigation by subtraction (X adv −ˆ ) does not go below and the mitigation by addition (X adv +ˆ ) does not go beyond.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the function M (·) which mitigates a large perturbation that JPEG encoding cannot nullify. M (·) is dedicated to making the large perturbation small such that JPEG encoding is separated as the soothing function from M (·). In Section 3, the way of estimating perturbation is introduced on X-MAS (i.e. when X ≈ W avg * X) and it is extended to the multilevel-mitigation for a large perturbation. In the end of the section, the proposed mitigation schemes are built in an algorithm with some relevant parameters. Section 4 evaluates the algorithm with some representing adversarial examples which have a large perturbation with the different relations between X and W avg * X. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the summary of our contribution.
Problem Setup
Previous researches (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Dziugaite et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2019) identified that JPEG encoding is able to nullify the impact of the adversarial perturbations on the prediction accuracy of a CNN. When the adversarial example X adv is JPEG-encoded and then fed into a CNN which recognizes the benign version of X adv , X as Y true ,
where P r[Y true |X] is the accuracy that a CNN predicts X as the true label Y true and is the adversarial perturbation applied to all the samples of an input image for a CNN. Usually, the relation "≈" of Equation (1) works well for the small perturbations but it is not valid for the large perturbations as shown in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , the perturbations s are crafted by the basic iterative FGSM attack (Kurakin et al., 2016a) . Figure 1a satisfies the relation "≈" of Equation (1) but Figure 1b does not. JP EG(·) compresses the image with the quality of 20 (out of 100). In order to make Figure 1b have the prediction accuracy comparable to Figure 1a , we need to mitigate X adv of Figure 1b to the level of X adv in Figure 1a . Let the mitigation function M (·) that mitigates the adversarial perturbation of Equation (1) be
whereˆ is the estimated perturbation which mitigates the perturbation by subtractingˆ for > 0 and addingˆ for < 0. To make the difference between M (X adv ) and X adv be imperceptible to human eyes,ˆ must be within the range of . That is,ˆ should work on the direction of decreasing the range of from [− , + ] to [− +ˆ , + −ˆ ] where 0 ≤ˆ ≤ . In Equation (2),ˆ is subtracted for X adv = X + and it is added to X adv = X − . By applying the mitigation function M (·), Equation (1) can be expressed with general terms as below
where SF (·) is the soothing function corresponding to JPEG encoding in Equation (1). Soothing function reduces the impact of the perturbation on the prediction accuracy. As a soothing function, JPEG encoding removes the high-frequency perturbations through DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) and quantization (Guo et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2019) . Also, the simple moving average filter (which runs the convolutional computations with the weight kernel where all the coefficients are one) can be used as the soothing function by smoothing the perturbations through the spatial average. In Section 3, we propose the method of estimatingˆ in Equation (2) and the way of mitigating the adversarial perturbation usingˆ .
Proposed method

Estimated perturbationˆ
In order to findˆ , we use the moving average filters that make X adv converge some value ranging from [X − , X + ]. That is,
where ≥ 0 and W avg is N × N (N ≥ 2) moving average window whose samples are convolved with the kernel that all the coefficients are one. The moving average operation "W avg * " decreases the difference between adjacent samples. Thus, the moving-average operation mitigates the perturbation as below.
W avg * X adv − W avg * X = ±W avg * ,
where |W avg | is the number of coefficients for N ×N W avg , N 2 and n is the perturbation assigned to each sample that W avg covers. In Equation(5), the cases satisfying W avg * | | < | | are more probable than the cases that meet W avg * = . For example, in order to make W avg * = in FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) attack (Goodfellow et al., 2014) , all the samples in the coverage of W avg have . The probability that each sample has the same in FGSM is 1 3 (i.e + among − , 0 and + ). So, the probability that the result of N × N moving-average computation becomes is 1 3 N 2 . Its value is about 5 × 10 −5 when 3 × 3 kernel is used for W avg . In the same manner, we can find the probability that the result of N × N moving-average computation becomes − and it is also 1 3 N 2 . Thus, when is generated by the rule of FGSM and the moving average kernel W avg is 3 × 3, the probability that the inequality W avg * < happens is 1 − 2 3 3 2 (≈ 0.9999). Since it is highly probable that W avg * | | < | |, we can use | | − W avg * | | as the estimated perturbation in order to make smaller. When X ≈ W avg * X,ˆ can be found by
where > 0, X adv = X + if the moving average output of X adv is smaller than X adv (i.e. X adv > W avg * X adv ) and X adv = X − if the moving average output of X adv is larger than X adv ((i.e. X adv < W avg * X adv ). X ≈ W avg * X can be satisfied by controlling |W avg | (usually, adjacent samples are close to each other).
In Equation (6), 0 <ˆ < such thatˆ can mitigate by either being subtracted from or being added to That is, when X adv > W avg * X adv ,ˆ is subtracted from X adv andˆ is added to X adv if X adv < W avg * X adv . Figure 2 illustrates howˆ mitigates .
In Figure 2 , the solid black line shows the upper and lower limits where the adversarial perturbation works on X. Thus, the red line which denotes the adversarial example X adv having ± as the adversarial perturbation, does not get out of the black line. Also, the solid green line indicates the upper and lower boundaries thatˆ works on X adv . If (X + −ˆ ) < X adv < (X + ), X adv has the positive such thatˆ (= − W avg * ) should be subtracted from X adv to reduce + . On the other hand, if (X − ) < X adv < (X − +ˆ ), X adv has the negative . Thus,ˆ should be added into X adv to increase − . Both X adv +ˆ and X adv −ˆ are closer to X than X + and X − are. In the same manner with X adv , the solid blue line that represents the adversarial example X 1 adv having ±( −ˆ ) as the adversarial perturbation, does not get out of the green line. Ifˆ = 0 (i.e. X adv = W avg * X adv ), all the samples within the coverage of W avg have the same . As discussed earlier, the probability that all the samples have the same is very low even in the small 3 × 3 W avg . It is much smaller than the probability that of X adv is 0 (e.g. 1 3 in the FGSM based attack). Thus, whenˆ = 0, it is more probable that the perturbation of X adv is zero rather than that all the samples have the same . Since we do not have to findˆ for the sample having no perturbation, we do not change X adv in case thatˆ = 0.
In Equation (6),ˆ can be larger than if X ≈ W avg * X. It is the case that samples within the moving average kernel are very different to each other. Then,ˆ may work as another perturbation. Also,ˆ can be too small to improve the prediction accuracy P r[Y true |(X adv ±ˆ )]. For both large and smallˆ , more mitigation steps would be required. Figure 3 shows the impact of the single-level mitigation on the prediction accuracy according to the sizes of in X adv . 0.9886 -"n03000134 chainlink fence" 0.0070 -"n04604644 worm fence, snake fence, snake-rail fence, Virginia fence" 0.0023 -"n06794110 street sign" Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv +/-ε)] = 0.0379 0.9555 -"n03000134 chainlink fence" 0.0379 -"n06794110 street sign" 0.0023 -"n04604644 worm fence, snake fence, snake-rail fence, Virginia fence"( b) Single-level mitigation may not work well on large perturbations crafted by the basic iterative FGSM attack with = 32 Figure 3 . Impact of the single-level mitigation on the prediction accuracy according to the sizes of in X adv
In Figure 3 , |W avg | = 3 × 3 for bothˆ and the soothing filter "W avg * " of P r[Y true |W avg * (X adv + / −ˆ )]. JP EG(·) compresses the image in the quality with 20 (out of 100). Figure 3a shows the case where single-level mitiga-tion works very well on the small perturbations to get the high prediction accuracy. However, the single-level mitigation is not so effective on the large perturbation in Figure  3b . In order to achieve a high prediction accuracy on the adversarial example having large perturbations, we need to run a multi-level mitigation in a controlled manner.
Multi-level mitigation
The single-level mitigation with the estimated perturbation in Equation (6) makes a new adversarial example X 1 adv that ranges (X adv +ˆ 0 , X adv −ˆ 0 ) where X adv for the lower boundary is X − , X adv for the upper limit is X + andˆ 0 isˆ of Equation (6). In order to find the upper and lower boundaries for X 2 adv which is mitigated from X 1 adv , we need to estimate the perturbationˆ 1 at both ends of the range for X 1 adv . Figure 4 illustrates the multi-level mitigation that estimatesˆ 1 . In Figure 4 , the grey line is the boundary condition for X adv (corresponding to the solid black line of Figure 2 ), the solid black line denotes the range of X 1 adv and the green line represents the upper and lower boundaries that X 2 adv can reach. As the level of mitigation goes deep, the accumulated sum of the estimated perturbations grows even though the estimated perturbation per each level decreases. Therefore, we should controlˆ to satisfy the following.
where p is the level of mitigation. However, in Equation (7), cannot be directly handled as a single term because it is hidden in X adv . In order to controlˆ , Equation (7) should be rephrased as below.
In case that adjacent samples are very different to each other, X ≈ W avg * X such that the estimated perturbation at the p-th step of the multi-level mitigation,ˆ p can be too large to satisfy Equation (8). Since X > , the large difference that breaks the relation of Equation (8) comes from the difference between the benign parts (i.e. X of X adv ). To relax the impact of the large differences on the estimated perturbations, we normalize the estimated perturbation at the p-th step of the multi-level mitigation as below.
where E[| · |] indicates both E[X p adv − (W avg * X p adv )] (to be subtracted from X p−1 adv ) and E[(W avg * X p adv ) − X p adv ] (to be added into X p−1 adv ). This normalization also preventŝ p from working as a serious perturbation for X adv having = 0 (∵ the mitigation scheme should work for the benign example).
In Equation (8), the boundary condition for both decreasing perturbation X p−1 adv −ˆ and increasing perturbation X p−1 adv + better be replaced with the value closer to X. As discussed earlier with Equation (5), the probability for W avg * | | < | | is much larger than W avg * | | = | | such that it is more probable that W avg * X adv is closer to X than X ± when W avg * X ≈ X. That is,
Thus, both X − and X + of Equation (8) can be replaced with W avg * X adv as following.
Equation (10) guarantees that the proposed multi-level mitigation gets X adv closer to X with the smaller (i.e. mitigated) perturbation having the same polarity with the original (i.e. unmitigated) perturbation if X ≈ W avg * X. That is, the term of decreasing , X p−1 adv −ˆ p does not go below W avg * X adv and the term of increasing , X p−1 adv +ˆ p does not go beyond W avg * X adv . To this end, W avg * X adv can be used as the decision boundary that determines the maximal mitigation-steps which affects the prediction accuracy. Figure 5 shows that the 70-step multi-level mitigation satisfying Equation (10) In Figure 5 , even though the prediction accuracies of Figure  5a are different according to soothing filters, the mitigation step where their prediction accuracies do not change any longer is same as shown in Figure 5b . This means that the boundary conditions of Equation (10) guarantee a certain level of prediction accuracy if the number of mitigation steps are large enough like the 70-step multi-level mitigation of Figure 5 . Thanks to Equation (10), we can build the algorithmic state machine having the point where the multilevel mitigation stops at.
Algorithm
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed method of mitigating adversarial perturbations.
Among the inputs of Algorithm 1, X adv and W avg are used to estimateˆ j and other parameters are related to the condition to stop the multi-level mitigation. As demonstrated in the previous sections, the proposed mitigation scheme has no dependency on the soothing filter and neural network architecture. However, the soothing filter and a CNN inference are required to check if the prediction accuracy gets saturated or not. Also, there should be an array having the size of k (which stores the previous prediction results) as the input parameter of the algorithm in order to see if the prediction accuracy of the current mitigation step is saturated or not.
Evaluation of proposed method
For the evaluation of the proposed mitigation scheme described in Algorithm 1, is crafted by FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) attacks (Kurakin et al., 2016a) on ResNet-50 (He et al., 2015) trained with ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009 ). Thus, the input parameter "CNN" of Algorithm 1 is ResNet-50. Also, both JPEG encoding and 3 × 3 moving average filter for the variable "SF". We repeat the mitigation until the prediction accuracy gets into a saturated point such that we do not specify the parameter k for this evaluation. The core part (i.e. estimating perturbations and checking the boundary condition for multi-level mitigation) of Algorithm 1 are written in "convert" script of ImageMagick (Unknown, 2013). The script when 3 × 3 W avg is used to findˆ is attached in Appendix A.
First of all, the proposed mitigation scheme should work for the case where = 0 since it does not know if its input image has any adversarial perturbation or not. Algorithm 1 keeps mitigating the perturbation unless it crosses over the boundary condition of W avg * X adv . When X adv has no perturbation, the boundary condition becomes W avg * X. Also, the estimated perturbationˆ comes from the difference between X and W avg * X. Since the proposed scheme is valid for the case X ≈ W avg * X,ˆ for does not make the prediction accuracy P r[Y true |Algorithm1(X)] far different from P r[Y true |W * X] (i.e. P r[Y true |Algorithm1(X)] ≈ P r[Y true |W * X]) as shown in Figure 6 .
In Figure 6a , P r[Y true |Algorithm1(X)] is slightly better Algorithm 1 Mitigating adversarial perturbations 1: //X adv is the adversarial example. 2: //ˆ is the estimated perturbation. 3: //Wavg is N × N moving average kernel. 4: //X j adv is the adversarial example at the j-th step mitigation 5: //ˆ j is the estimated perturbation at the j-step mitigation 6: //Wavg * X adv is the local expectation that Wavg covers. 7: //k is the size of an array having CNN inference results from X j−(k−1) adv to X j adv 8: //SF is the soothing filter like JPEG encoding 9: //CNN is a convolutional neural network 10: 11: Input: X adv , Wavg, k, SF, CNN 12: //initial step j is set to zero 13: j = 0; 14: //initialize the variable that counts the number of consecutive k-steps 15: //whose prediction accuracies are same 16: equal count = 0; 17: repeat 18:
if X j adv ≥ (Wavg * X j adv ) then 19:
//Findˆ j to be subtracted from X j−1 adv 20:ˆ j = X j adv − (Wavg * X j adv ); 21:
//Mitigate the perturbation withˆ j iffˆ j ≤ˆ j−1 22:
if (j > 0 ) && (ˆ j ≤ˆ j−1 ) then 23:
//Subtractˆ j from X j−1 adv 24: //if and only if this subtraction meets Equation (10) 25:
if (X j−1 adv −ˆ j ) > Wavg * X adv then 26:
X j adv = X j−1 adv −ˆ j ; 27: else 28:
X j adv = X j−1 adv ; 29:
end if 30:
end if 31: else 32:
//Findˆ j to be added to X j−1 adv 33:ˆ j = (Wavg * X j adv ) − X j adv ; 34:
//Mitigate the perturbation withˆ j iffˆ j ≤ˆ j−1 35:
if (j > 0 ) && (ˆ j ≤ˆ j−1 ) then 36: //Addˆ j to X j−1 adv 37: //if and only if this addition satisfies Equation (10) 
This means that X is purely mitigated (i.e. perturbed) by the difference of benign parts among adjacent samples but the mitigation does not work as a serious perturbation since the difference (of benign parts among adjacent samples) cannot make X cross over the boundary condition W avg * X according to Equation (10). When X ≈ W avg * X in Figure 6b , Algorithm 1 keeps mitigating the perturbation (i.e. adding/subtracting the difference between X and W avg * X to/from X) until X p adv (X adv in p-step mitigation, actually X p for the case = 0) has the minimum distance from W avg * X. As the result, P r[Y true |Algorithm1(X)] ≈ P r[Y true |W avg * X] even though P r[Y true |Algorithm1(X)] ≈ P r[Y true |X].
Most moving average outcomes for the input images of a CNN are predicted as the same label with their original images (i.e. P r[Y true |X] ≈ P r[Y true |W avg * X]) because the moving average convolution of the input image works as the low-pass filter like human eyes. Figure 7 shows that Algorithm 1 well estimatesˆ j when X ≈ W avg * X.
In Figure 7 , the rank of prediction accuracy should be carefully handled. When JPEG encoding is used as the soothing filter without the mitigation steps (i.e. for the case of P r[Y true |JP EG(X adv )]), it achieves top-2 accuracy for Figure 7a as well as it gets top-3 accuracy for Figure 7b . However, both cases work well as the adversarial examples having dominant prediction accuracies. Especially for P r[Y true |JP EG(X adv )] of Figure 7a , no one can say it is okay to reach the top-2 accuracy with the probability of 0.0285 because the wrong recognition can be fatal to a Thus, when we talk about the prediction accuracy, the number in probability can be much more important than the rank of the accuracy. Figure 8 shows the cases that the number in probability plays an important role in the proposed mitigation. Figure 8 shows the cases that P r[Y true |X] ≈ P r[Y true |W avg * X]. Figure 8a does not have Y true (∵ ImageNet dataset does not have the label corresponding to sunflower) and Figure 8b has far different numbers for P r[Y true |X] and P r[Y true |W avg * X]. In Figure 8a , P r[Y daisy |X] becomes the ground truth because the CNN inference having no label for sunflower recognizes X as daisy (i.e. Y daisy ). Algorithm 1 increases the prediction accuracy for Y daisy from 0.1187 to 0.4805 because P r[Y daisy |X] ≈ P r[Y daisy |W avg * X]. However, in Figure  8b , even though both ranks of the prediction accuracies P r[Y true |X] and P r[Y true |W avg * X] are dominant (i.e. top-1 rank), the proposed mitigation does not improve the prediction accuracy very much because P r[Y true |X] ≈ P r[Y true |W avg * X] (i.e. the difference between X and W avg * X works as a perturbation).
|W avg | better be as large as possible if the corresponding W avg satisfies P r[Y true |X] ≈ P r[Y true |W avg * X] with a high probability. It is becauseˆ (i.e. the difference between X adv and W avg * X adv ) can be well normalized with a large |W avg |. Therefore, the difference of estimated perturbations between consecutive steps (i.e. ∆ˆ j,j−1 =ˆ j−1 -ˆ j ) can be controlled in a finer-granule manner. This means that the proposed mitigation Algorithm 1 can get X adv closer to X so that it achieves a high prediction accuracy without any help of the soothing filter like JPEG encoding. Figure 9 shows that the proposed mitigation scheme in Algorithm 1 gets the high prediction accuracy for the adversarial example having a very large perturbation with some large moving average window (i.e. |W avg | = 7 × 7) when P r[Y true |X] ≈ P r[Y true |W avg * X] with a high probability.
In Figure 9 , both Figure 9a and 9b satisfy P r[Y true |X] ≈ P r[Y true |W avg * X] with a high probability. However, Algorithm 1 mitigates Figure 9a better than Figure 9b with the larger moving average kernel. In Figure 9a , Algorithm 1 can get a high prediction accuracy without JPEG encoding. But, Figure 9b shows that Algorithm 1 cannot get any prediction accuracy without JPEG encoding.
For the FGSM attack without clipping function ("fast" attack in (Kurakin et al., 2016a) ), the large perturbation can seriously distort an image by generating out-of-bound samples. That is, it makes the samples in the range [0, ) become zero and it also makes the samples belonging to (255 − , 255] have the maximum value, 255. Then, Algorithm 1 would not well mitigate the perturbations because the size of estimated perturbation |ˆ | can be reduced by the amount of | − X| for the sample X in the range [0, ) or by the amount of |X − (255 − )| for X in the range (255 − , Figure 10 shows how the performance of Algorithm 1 varies according to out-of-bound samples.
In Figure 10 , fast FGSM attack is used to generate two distinct numbers of out-of-bound samples, which show the impact of the out-of-bound samples on the performance of Algorithm 1. The statistical numbers of (Red, Green, Blue) tuples come from ImageMagick "convert" script (Unknown, 2013) . In fast FGSM attacks, is the knob to control the number of out-of-bound samples. The number of out-ofbound samples increases when goes up. Also, the number of out-of-bound samples decreases as goes down. In Figure 10 , the adversarial example generated by the fast FGSM attack with = 16 has the smaller number of out-of-bound samples (682 vs 3573 for (0,0,0) tuples and 216 vs 3147 for (255,255,255) tuples). Larger number of out-of-bound samples makes more perceptible perturbations. Algorithm 1 shows the better performance (i.e. prediction accuracy represented as P r[Y true |Algorithm1(X adv )]) when the number of out-of-bound samples is small (i.e. when the perturbation is imperceptible). The number of out-of-bound samples can be very different according to the attack methods. For example, the adversarial example crafted by the iterative least-likely FGSM attack with = 64 has the smaller number of out-of-bound samples than the adversarial example generated by the fast FGSM attack with = 16. It is because the iterative least-likely FGSM attack has the clipping 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the scheme that mitigates the perturbations on an adversarial example through the estimation of the perturbations on X-MAS (X minus Moving Average Samples i.e. when X ≈ W avg * X). For large perturbations (i.e. > 16), the scheme is further developed to run the multi-step mitigation that has W avg * X adv as the boundary condition to prevent the p-step mitigated adversarial example X p adv from getting worse by crossing over the boundary. The multi-level mitigation gets X adv closer to X for the most adversarial examples whose benign part have the relation that X ≈ W avg * X. We evaluate the proposed algorithm with some representing examples that have the different relations between X and W avg * X. In the evaluation, our proposed scheme well mitigates the imperceptibly crafted large adversarial perturbations (through iterative FGSM attacks with a clipping function) such that it gets the adversarial examples with the mitigated perturbations have high prediction accuracies when X ≈ W avg * X.
A. The script for 100-step multi-level mitigation 
